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(L. A. No. 20859. In Bank. JAn. 25, 194'.]

MOUSHEK ClU.K.M.AKJIAN, Rc.-;pondcnt, v. JENNIE
LOWE, Appdlant.
Against Unin!!Ure4 Employers.-Tht> rieht of an injured employee uuder Lab. Code,
i 3706, to briDle an ILction for dr.mages ngrunst an uninsured
employ.. \' mILy be exercised inflep"udently of anyprocp.etlings
b~fort· the Industrilll Accidl'nt Commi~;!ion.
(2] Appeal-Review-Mattera After Judgment Appealed. From.On appelll from a jl1c4."IIlcnt for an injured em ployr e in liis
damage action ngainst an wUnsured cmployl'r, the court CAnnot
review the clAim that by reason of a subsequent compensation
award there is a double recovery, since such question wa.s Dot
before the trial court in the disposition of the action.
(3a, 3b] Workmen's OompeDl&tion - Actions Against Uninsured
Bmployera-Evidence.-ID an actioD by Iln injured saw oper[1] Workme~·. Oompcnsation-_,,"ctions

[1] ~ 26 Oa.LJur. 263.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 14; [2]
Appeal and Error, § 972; [31 Workmen's CompcDs:ttion, § 11;
[4] Evidence, t L.1lT; [5, 6] Workml~n's ComllCD3ation, 119.
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ator ngninst his uninsured employer, the stlltutory presllmption
of defendant's nr.gligence (Lab. Code, § 3708) was not dispcllr.d
by plaintiff's testimony that he operAted the ,','Was it '\"as
"set up" for his use-and that "there was no chant'3 to put up
a block," since sueb testimony 'Would support an inference
that defendant· negligently maintnined the Raw in such cOlldition tbllt it 'Wa!; impossible to "put up a block," and that such
negligence was the cause of the nccidClnt.
[4] Evidence--Presumptions-Operation and E1rect.~A presumption is dispelled as an evidentiary consideration when a fact
whie,b is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by uneonnadic~d t.est.imony of the party relying on it or of such party's
own wit-nesses, where such testimony 'Was not the product of
mistake or inadvertence.
[5] Workmen's Compen:lation-Actions Against Uninsured Employers--AppeaL-In nn nction by an injured saw operator
against his uninsured employer, whether the statutory presumption of defendant's negligence 'Was controverted 'Was •
question to be determined by the trial court under the evidence,
and its finding that plaintiff's injury 'Was the direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence 'Was conclusive on appeal.
[8] ld.-Actions Against Uninsured EmploJlD-Appeal. - In an
action by an employee IIgainst his uninSlll'ed employer, a finding of the employer's negligence \vas conclusive on appeal
where plaintiff's evidence fully disclosed the circumstances
surrounding the happening -of the accident and that plaintiff
had no choice but to use the tool provided for the work in
r - question, and where its condition for safe usc was a factual
If;' consideration in the light of the evidence.

t.~, APPEAL from n judgment of the Su})~rior Court of Los
t~gc~esCounty. Ruben S. Schmidt, Judge. AffirlDt..od.

r'

Action against uninsured employer for damages for perinjuries sustained by employee. Judgment for plaintiff

~fIOnal

I'

f;'ai'lirIDCd.

~"

'

Stan_ & Stanton for A ppcn.n~

. \'HerlihY & Hr.rlihy and .Toseph W. Pierce for Respondent.
':t '

.' SPENCE, J.-nnfcndant, an uninsured employer, appeal.
,m L\ judgment for plaintiff rendered on account of injuries
ined by plnintiff while in defendant's employ. As grounds
9!· rcvcrs.'ll d~f~ndant urges: (1) the chrge of plaintiff'.
~.u,ble recovery because in subsequent pruceedingll bclore Lhe
~--.
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! ----------------------------------------~ one injury" in view of the 8'Ubsequent terminlltion of the in·
~.dependent- proceedings before the commission in plaintiff's

• favor. Whether defendant would be entitled to a credit of

!" the judgment against the greater amount of the compensation

t award upon plaintiff's undertaking to collect both amounts

t as separately adjudicated by the designated t.ribunals is not
~ a matter for consideration here (C/., 8ullivan v. Tait, 38
i: Cal.App.2d 185 [101 P.2d 145]), for defendant contests the

I validity of the judgment, not the

premise of its enforcement
.' in the admeasurement of plaintiff's total relief. In snch dis; tinguishable circumstances, the merit of defendant's objection
to the successive awards as embracing a "double recovery"
'.' ii'not an issue for review within the scope of this appeal.
j ~ [Sa] There now remains for considr.ration defendant's
challenge of the evidentiary support for the court's finding
~. of negligence as the issue was tendered by the parties' plead.
~;,iDgs. (Cf., Graybiel v. Oonsol.id.ated Associations, Ltd., supra,
[16 Cal.App.2d 20, 26.) 8ectl0n3708 of the Labor Code, so
f; far as here pertinent, provides that in an action such as the
[~t one ". . . it is presumed that the injury to the em.
i ployee was a direct result and grew out of the negligence of
ft;he employer, and ~e burden o~ proof is uP.on the employer, to
'. rebut the presumptIon of neglIgence. It 18 not a defense to
the employer that the employee was guilty of contributory
'. negligence, or assumed the risk of· the hazard complained of,
;~~.t, Defendant argues that plaintiff's own testimony afrIlmul~tively established that there was no negligence on her
'p~ that the statutory presumption to the contrary was
eiereby dispelled from the case, and there then remained no
l..,nQ,en(~ which would sustain her liability for plaintiff's inThere is no force to defendaut's position upon analysis
. relevant porti~ns of therer.ora:'----',---- " .,.-,- ,
.It appears that plaintiff, while employed as a, saw operator
in other capacities in defendant's cabinet shop, injured
left hand-lacerations of the thumb and second and third
ilngera-in the process of operating a power-driven ripsaw
for the cutting of a piece of wood for a window frame. Plain'was alone at tHe time of the accident and was the sole
I:!liritnles8 thereto. After testifying that he was experienced in
operation of power-driven saws and demonstrating his
loss of the use of his injured hand as affecting his
employment in carpentry work, plaintiH gave this
of the accident: That the saw he was using was "imin a small table" with "the motor operating it on the

)
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side"; that "the saw" had ". guide" to set the "measurements"; that "as I was cutting like this, because that got to
do this way, see, from the top, the s:lW in turning in the bottom, you have t.o get your piece on top like that and push
right down on it, so the saw comes right on top here and cuts
here to here (indicating)"; that "when I was doing this,
this happened • • • hand • • • slip or jump, I don't knowstill it happened when I was going down this way, see. "Later
in the trial as a witness for plaintiff, a safety inspector for
the State Division of Industrial Safety, who had examined
the saw in queStion and who had heard· plaintiff's testimony
., concerning the way he cut this piece by holding it, one end
of it with hit left hand • • • the other end with his right hand
••• lowering the thing over the saw," testified as follows:
That the manner in which plaintiff described his operation
of the 8&W was "the customary method.. . . in small back
yard shops"; that "one of the reasons why I am in the field
[is] that we try to discourage such manual operations to prevent just what· happened to [plaintiff] .•• it is common
.practice • • • it ian't safe practice." The inspector further
stated that "anybody with any experience in cabinet work"
should know that the use of a .. block" or "table stop" to
"prevent the piece [as cut] from being kicked back," would
guard against the happening of just such accident as the one
here involved. Plaintif[ then testified that the saw was "set
up" by hill [former] employer-the husband of defendant,
who, upon her husband's death, had undertaken to manage
the business and operate the shop; that he (plaintiff) made no
change in "the machine at aU after [defendant's husband]
died" but Continued to "use it" ai it was "set up"; that he
"did ••• DOt set up a block before [he] used the saw"; and
that "there was no chance to put up a block. I t
The court found that "as the direct and proximate re$1l1t
of the ncglia-ence and carelessness of the said defendant, plaintUI'8 left' hand was then and there drawn into and became
enlraged with the teeth of said saw." This is the finding that
defendant att:lcks lUI running counter to all the evidence, arguing that since it appears from plaintiff's own testimony that
"defendant gave him no instructions as to the use of the saws;
thl\t in fact she knew nothing about the use of the saws"; and
that plaintif[ "himself [had] neglected to employ the known
lafeguard of placing the block on the saw"; the rebuttable
presumption of negligence imposed by statute upon defendant (Lab. Code, § 3708, IUpra)" was dectively destroyed and
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the record stands devoid of any support for plnintifl"11 cause
of action.
[4] Gcnerally speaking, it may be statcd that a pr('snmption is dispelled as an evidentiary consideration when a. fact
which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted 'testimony of the party relying upon it or of such
party's own witnesses. when such testimony was not the prodnct of mistake or inadvertence. (Mar Shee v. Maryland AsIUrance Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P. 269] ; SmelUe v. Southern
Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540, 553 [299 P. 529] ; Engstrom v. Auburn Automobile Sales Corp., 11 CaUd 64,70 [77 P.2d 1059] ;
Westberg v. Willde,l' Cal.2d 360, 365 [94 P.2d 590] ; Fortier'
v. Hogan, 115 Cal.App. 50, 57 [1 P.2d 23].) [3b] However,
the situation here prevailing is distinguishable
that plaintiff's testimony is not "wholly irreconcilable" with the operative force of the presumption of defendant'. neJ!'ligence. On
the contrary, conceding that as an experienced carpenter
plaintiff should have used a "block" as a precautionary safeguard in his performance of the work in question, nevertheless his testimony that he operated the saw as it was "set up"
for his use and "there was no chance to put up a block" would
support an inference that defendant negligently maintained
the saw in such condition that it was impossible to "put up
a block," and that such negligence was th~ cause of the accident. As above noted, the common-law· defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are expressly denied
by statute to defendant in such action as the present one.
(Lab. Code, §3708, supra.) [5] In such circumstances, whether
the presumption of def\lndant'8 negligence was controverted
was at best a question to be determined by the trial court, and
ita finding thereon would be conclusive. (Fortier v. Hogan,
.upra, 115 Cal.App. 50, 58.)
[6] But even were it to be said that since plaintiff's evidence
fully disclosed the circumstances surrounding the happening
of the accident-his acts and conduct jUst prior to and at the
time of his injury-there would be no reason for the presumption of defendant's negligence to stay in the case and it disappears therefrom (Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal.
36, 38 [297 P. 884] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Ca1.2d 111, 119
[47 P.2d 709] ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Ca1.2d294, 296 [65 P.2d
65]), such conclusion would not aid defendant under the
record. There would still remain as a factor in evidence the
inference from plaintiff's testimony that defendant was guilty
of negligence by reason of the particular manner of maiute-

m
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nance of the saw in her cabinet shop-a consideration which
would preclude holding, as a matter of law, that defendant
was not guilty of fault in conclusive defeat of plaiutiff's
damage claim. Defendant's citation of the case of Spwok v.
Independent StJ8h If Door Co., 173 Cal. 438 [160 P. 565), does
not strengthen her argument. There the plaintiff-a carpenter
in defendant's employ-could have used a stairway provided
by his employer as a safe means for passing from oue flour
to another in the Course of his work, but plaintiff deliberately
chose another means of approach and sustained certain injuries
as the result of his needless risk. Accordingly," [t]he concluSion [was] unescapable that the employer . . . was without
fault and that the injury occurred solely through the negligence of the employee." (P. 44:0.) Here plaintiff had no
choice but to use the saw provided by defendant for the work
in question, and its condition for safe use was a factual consideration in the light of the record. (Cf., Lewis v. Curran,
17 Cal.App.2d 689, 695-696 [62 P.2d 800].) As so determined,
the finding that plaintiff's injury was "the direct and proximate result of [defendant's] negligence and carelessness"
is not open to objection as being without evidentiary support.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYN.()R, J .-1 concur in the judgment.
th~ as a matter of legislative policy seetion 3708 of the Labor Code places upon the employer the
burden of proof, which remains upon him throughout the
case. (Compare, Hunter v. Hunter, 111 Cal. 261, 267 [43
P. 756,52 Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411]; Wilcoz v. Wilcoz,
171 Cal. 770, 774 [155 P. 95] ; Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal.
82, 95 [183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313]; O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118
Conn. 58, 65 [170 A. 486, 488] ; Am. Law Institute, Model
Code of Evidence, rule 703.) The employer in this case has
not sustained that burden. It therefore serves no purpose
to consider when the presumption was dispelled. That question would be pertinent only if the plaintiff had the burden of
proof, aided by the presumption. (See dissenting opinion in
Speck v. Saruer, 20 Cal.2d585, 590-598 [128 P.2d 16].)

It is my opinion

Edmonds, J., concnrred.
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